"Changes in Sino-U.S. Relations and North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Game"의 두 판 사이의 차이
Kssocietas wiki (토론 | 기여) (새 문서: ==강연 소개== Some key nuclear policy objectives of the United States and its allies often appear as incompatible, even contradictory with one another. A case in point is the Apr...) |
Kssocietas wiki (토론 | 기여) |
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| 1번째 줄: | 1번째 줄: | ||
| + | {{Personal Information | ||
| + | |name = [[한성주 (고려대학교 명예교수)|Han Sung-Joo]] | ||
| + | |hangeul = 한성주 | ||
| + | |latin = [[한성주 (고려대학교 명예교수)|Han Sung-Joo]] | ||
| + | |photo = 20. Han Sung-Joo.jpg|300px | ||
| + | |nationality = Korea | ||
| + | |affiliation = Korea University | ||
| + | }} | ||
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==강연 소개== | ==강연 소개== | ||
Some key nuclear policy objectives of the United States and its allies often appear as incompatible, even contradictory with one another. A case in point is the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. It tries to capture three seemingly incompatible goals in one basket—reduction of the role and number of nuclear weapons, deterrence, and non-proliferation. In Asia, the contradictions seem to be particularly conspicuous. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, by emphasizing the objective of “strengthening regional deterrence and reassurance of U.S. allies and partners,” the NPR emphatically reaffirmed the Cold War era U.S. policy of extending deterrence to its selected allies in Europe and Asia including Japan and South Korea. However, by also emphasizing the goal of “reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons” and “maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels,” the Review had the effect of causing concern among the alliance leaders about possible weakening of the effectiveness of the extended deterrence. Regarding another key objective listed in the Review, that of “preventing nuclear proliferation,” America’s extended (nuclear) deterrence has had and will continue to have the effect of strengthening the will of the proliferators to continue and speed up their work although clearly it has discouraged the beneficiaries of the extended deterrence from proliferating themselves. | Some key nuclear policy objectives of the United States and its allies often appear as incompatible, even contradictory with one another. A case in point is the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. It tries to capture three seemingly incompatible goals in one basket—reduction of the role and number of nuclear weapons, deterrence, and non-proliferation. In Asia, the contradictions seem to be particularly conspicuous. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, by emphasizing the objective of “strengthening regional deterrence and reassurance of U.S. allies and partners,” the NPR emphatically reaffirmed the Cold War era U.S. policy of extending deterrence to its selected allies in Europe and Asia including Japan and South Korea. However, by also emphasizing the goal of “reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons” and “maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels,” the Review had the effect of causing concern among the alliance leaders about possible weakening of the effectiveness of the extended deterrence. Regarding another key objective listed in the Review, that of “preventing nuclear proliferation,” America’s extended (nuclear) deterrence has had and will continue to have the effect of strengthening the will of the proliferators to continue and speed up their work although clearly it has discouraged the beneficiaries of the extended deterrence from proliferating themselves. | ||
==강연 영상== | ==강연 영상== | ||
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| + | [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PZfgIoNHzn4 Sino-U.S. Relations and North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Game] | ||
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| + | <iframe width="500" height="300" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/PZfgIoNHzn4" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe> | ||
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| + | [[분류:소키에타스]] | ||
2016년 9월 23일 (금) 17:24 판
| Han Sung-Joo | |
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| Name in Latin Alphabet: | Han Sung-Joo |
|---|---|
| Nationality: | Korea |
| Affiliation: | Korea University |
강연 소개
Some key nuclear policy objectives of the United States and its allies often appear as incompatible, even contradictory with one another. A case in point is the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. It tries to capture three seemingly incompatible goals in one basket—reduction of the role and number of nuclear weapons, deterrence, and non-proliferation. In Asia, the contradictions seem to be particularly conspicuous. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, by emphasizing the objective of “strengthening regional deterrence and reassurance of U.S. allies and partners,” the NPR emphatically reaffirmed the Cold War era U.S. policy of extending deterrence to its selected allies in Europe and Asia including Japan and South Korea. However, by also emphasizing the goal of “reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons” and “maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels,” the Review had the effect of causing concern among the alliance leaders about possible weakening of the effectiveness of the extended deterrence. Regarding another key objective listed in the Review, that of “preventing nuclear proliferation,” America’s extended (nuclear) deterrence has had and will continue to have the effect of strengthening the will of the proliferators to continue and speed up their work although clearly it has discouraged the beneficiaries of the extended deterrence from proliferating themselves.
강연 영상
Sino-U.S. Relations and North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Game
