Korean Studies and its Formative Role in Higher Education in Singapore: New Possibilities and Existing Constraints

Korean Studies and its Formative Role in Higher Education in Singapore: 
New Possibilities and Existing Constraints
(for AKS workshop, June 2015)
John DiMoia, National University of Singapore
hisjpd@nus.edu.sg

Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, 2014-2016 jdimoia@mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de

I. The Postcolonial Imaginary and Comparative National Historiography:

Placing Singapore and South Korea in dialogue? Prior to discussing the institutional foundations of Korean Studies in Singapore, it first helps to recognize that much of Singapore’s tertiary education system is predicated on justifying and explaining its own postcolonial independence story, one that begins with the 1965 declaration of independence. Prior to this, Singapore formed part of a larger union, linked with Malaysia in a cross-straits relationship lasting through 1963, eventually undertaking the controversial decision to go it alone as a city state. I mention this background context to explain how and why recent history figures so prominently within the Singapore story. If South Korea’s Cold War origins (1948- ) as the product of an unexpected division create an obvious tension with its colonial (1910-1945) and Chŏson pasts (1392-1910); similarly, Singapore’s story is comparably rooted in it colonial legacy (1819- ), although in this case, British colonialism often receives a surprisingly positive reading. Instead, as with South Korea, it is the recent Japanese past (1942-1945), the brutal occupation taking place during the war, which provides the explanatory mechanism for the 1965 decision, as well as the justification for much of present-day policy. To offer another comparison not necessarily obvious to a Korean audience, Singapore still sees itself as very much an anti-Communist state, the product of a decolonizing Southeast Asia during the early stages of the Cold War. If South Korea borders on neighboring North Korea, an uneasy relationship persisting until the present, Singapore found itself emerging as a nation during a period known as the “Malayan Emergency” (1948-1960) a period often not receiving sufficient attention in the Western historiography. In simple terms, the emergency saw the heightened activities of a diasporic Chinese community, of which some members were sympathetic to region-based Communism, and this discontent dominated for much of the 1950s. Bombings, attacks at night, and a general atmosphere of tension were among the visible signs of an underground rebellion, one eventually put down by the British military presence, although not without considerable cost. In any case, the transition to Singapore nationhood in 1965 was marked by (1) a brief Japanese military presence, followed by (2) the threat of communism, and these twin pillars continue to dominate Singapore’s public sphere today, a nation that perceives its relations to the world in terms of a series of ongoing threats, whether economic, political, or military. Figure 1: Park Geun-hye visit Vietnam.

II. Korean Studies at NUS: Tertiary Institutions, Initial Foundations, and Possible Growth Opportunities

Figure 2; AS8 under construction. Figure 3: AS8 / Asian Studies (and Korean Studies) at NUS, artist’s conception.

Korean Studies is relatively new in Singapore, and with the above frame in place as background, it should be obvious that a large part of its pedagogical role is comparative, as Singaporeans love to see how they are doing with respect to their Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian neighbors. There are four universities in Singapore at present: NUS (National University of Singapore), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), SMU (Singapore Management University), and SUTD (Singapore University of Technology and Design), with this last involving a close tie-up with MIT, specifically aiming for engineering and design. I can only speak to the first two of these, given my familiarity with NUS and NTU, so please understand the limitations of my remarks, as matters are changing rapidly even as we speak. At NUS, Korean Studies only dates to the last decade or so (mid-2000s), with language funding providing the beginnings of what has now become a full four year program of study, much of it underwritten by the Korea Foundation and the South Korean embassy in Singapore. The language modules are enormously popular, and indeed, students at the first year level sometimes complain that the demand for seats / places continue to outpace the supply. With language as the foundation, the various partners invested in building a Korean Studies presence in Singapore have added to this base gradually. The language program uses materials created at Kyunghee University, and this is just one of several institutional relationships now shaping the larger process of cultural exchange. At NUS, students interested in pursuing Korea-related themes also have the opportunity to pursue either a one year or a six month program of study at Korea University, our main partner for an SEP (student exchange program) relationship. In turn, Korean students frequently spend time at NUS, and this does not appear to be restricted to Korea University, as I have had students from Seoul National University, Pusan National University, and Yonsei University in my classes, among others. Moreover, the summer programs housed at various Korean Universities provide a further outlet for study, and a significant number of Singaporean students have begun to enroll at such programs to gain a short-term exposure, before making any decisions. With this foundation in place, NUS next plans to develop further, although how it will do this remains very much an area for speculation. Currently, the university is building a new structure, AS8 (see Figure Two), which will house the Global Studies program upon its completion. It is rumored that Global Studies will provide for at least two-three Korea lecturer positions, although I believe the hiring / search process has not yet begun. For these positions, the likelihood is that the emphasis will rest with recent Korean history as a model to explore social issues of interest to Singapore, as Global Studies is officially run by the Political Science department at NUS. In other words, placing South Korea within its regional context, the new hires will likely offer modules relating to the Korea Wave (hallyu), South Korea and its experience with regional labor and migration issues, and especially, demographic and family issues. Singapore, like South Korea, faces an acute low fertility problem, and experiences considerable migration from Southeast Asia and China. Along with this attention to the administrative end of business, NUS intends to, and is strongly committed to recruiting students from South Korea, and it is easy to find such visiting students on campus in a wide range of majors. In addition, there is a substantial body of Singapore-raised Koreans, primarily those whose parents have migrated for a combination of education and professional reasons. These students tend to be native, or near-native, speakers of English and Korean, often have previous experience with Singapore education at the secondary and JC (junior college) levels, and may want to attend NUS for the duration of their undergrad experience. In these cases, it is not unusual to find Koreans who hold scholarships, take up positions as campus leaders, and adapt quite readily, as their experience in Singapore is lengthy, often dating from childhood. With this diverse population of Koreans in mind, there is now a student-run newspaper, HanNUS, which appears regularly, and is published in Korean (hangul script), and is distributed at campus media outlets. I believe this last example dates to only this year, but it is yet another sign of the growing campus presence of Koreans. To this point, my remarks have dealt exclusively with South Korea, but I have to be fair and mention that there is a quiet but growing North Korean presence in Singapore, and it is one with significant implications for higher education. North Korea maintains an embassy and trade mission in Singapore, and given the city’s legacy as a port, it is not surprising that the north runs its ships through the container facilities in SEA, whether identified as NK, or sailing under another nation’s flag. In turn, there is considerable trade between Singapore and North Korea, with Singapore joining China, South Korea, and Japan as one of the North’s major trading partners. In particular, Singapore Chinese sometimes find the North to be a good investment site, given its low costs, and the possibility of greater engagement in the future. There is even a Singapore-based NGO, Choson Exchange, dedicated to bringing North Koreans to Singapore, where they receive training and exposure to the forces of global capital within a fairly safe, contained environment. Given this small but vibrant presence, it is possible to claim that the two Koreas each require addressing in any Korean Studies program. Clearly South Korea is the larger and more significant presence, with approximately 15,000-20,000 residents on the island, and with an accompanying economic and cultural presence. At the same time, Singapore remains, as always, highly pragmatic in its approach, and wants equally to reach out to the estimated 25-50 North Koreans present on island at any given time. Nanyang Technological University has agreed to sponsor a limited number of the North’s students as undergraduates beginning in Fall 2015 with academic scholarships, and it is possible that NUS might make a similar gesture in the near future. To this end, I teach primarily the South Korean historical narrative in my module, although I also include a fair amount of material on the north, especially in relationship to Southeast Asia. With the two Koreas holding an interest not only in Singapore, but also in mainland Southeast Asia (especially Vietnam), it is likely that this north-south relationship will grow in strength. ASEAN and Southeast Asia: Prospects for Korea? On this last point, it is critical to remember that Southeast Asia holds enormous promise for South Korean investment and the prospect of improved diplomatic relations. Singapore, as already noted, houses any number of Korean companies and overseas corporate personnel, in addition to serving as a major hub for secondary and tertiary education. Indonesia continues to attract investment, especially given the optimism associated with the new rule of President Jokowi. For mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos will continue to attract tourists, and in the last two cases especially, there is increasing Korean investment in infrastructure (through KOICA and other partners), especially in the related areas of construction and banking, as both of these countries are still very much at the developmental stage. Still, it is Vietnam that offers the greatest interest, in part because of its potential to offset China as a site for labor and manufacturing, and in part because of its close historical ties to the Korean past. With her visit to multiple ASEAN nations in Fall 2014 (see Figure One), ROK President Park Geun-hye made it clear that South Korea plans to build upon these ties, and the press coverage for this diplomatic tour was very strong in Singapore. For Vietnam specifically, it is clear that the existing pattern of investment (factories, infrastructure) is something that the ROK wishes to continue, especially for the energy industry, offering the possibility of the sale of thermal and possibly nuclear energy plants in the future. At the same time, it remains clear that the historical tensions associated with the Vietnam War (1965-1973) are still strong, and in particular, regarding South Korea’s role as an actor in the conflict. On this point, I think Korean Studies holds the potential for opportunity, as an understanding of Korean history may go a long way towards increased understanding, even if there will be some differences in perception concerning certain events. For Vietnam, and for greater ASEAN, Korea therefore offers, at least potentially, a model not only for economic development, but also in terms of the story of rapid cultural and social change associated with the last several decades. Korean family dramas are especially popular in Southeast Asia, and some historians and cultural theorists have speculated that this identification happens precisely because of the common cultural points, providing Indonesians, Vietnamese, Malaysians, Filipinos and others with another viewpoint towards what it means to change as a society. In Singapore, Korean dramas have a prominent place on cable television, and they are offered with Bahasa (Bahasa Malaysia) subtitles, indicating an audience demographic above and beyond the expected ones for English-language and Mandarin. I have taught my Korean history module 3 times at NUS, beginning in 2009, and the diversity of the students always fits the remarks above, with a number of ASEAN students joining the Singaporeans in the class. This module, “20th Century Korean History,” began in 2009 with about 50 students, and was most recently at 89 students when I taught it in Fall 2014 Cumulatively, the combination of the popularity of Korean pop culture, along with the basic infrastructure already established at NUS, suggests the potential for some significant developments, especially as a regional or SEA center for Korea. At the same time, I have to acknowledge that there are also many problems to confront, especially as Singapore remains extremely uncomfortable in confronting its own history. In other words, Singapore enjoys pop culture, and even using Korea as a basis for comparison in talking about social issues. It is not ready, however, to approach the more serious and overlapping issues of civil society, political structures in transition, and the very real possibility of evolving politically in the period following Lee Kwan Yew. In this last section, we can turn to this, the lessons South Korea may hold, as well as the limitations / constraints of the Singapore situation.

III. Constraints?

The media in Singapore often like to use Taiwan and South Korea as metrics for Singapore when making comparisons, whether economic or social. This type of comparison illustrates some of the basic tensions existing between the three countries, as Singapore likes to underscore what it perceives as signs of social disorder in the other two. For example, several years ago, Singapore featured a lesson on globalization in its MOE (Ministry of Education) secondary school texts, emphasizing that global capital does bring with it a number of unexpected problems. One of the featured problems was labor and homelessness, and the text emphasized the relevance of this problem for Asian cities. Specifically, the inset featured images taken from Seoul Station, although the individuals were not identified as Korean (see Figure Four). Hangul signs from stores nearby made it clear to anyone who could read the contextual cues that this was located somewhere in Korea. At the time, the Korean embassy in Singapore protested, and Singapore quickly apologized for what it claimed was a random mistake in judgment.

Figure 4: The homeless problem as depicted in a Singapore textbook. However, in this account, I do not believe that the choice of the photographic image was random, nor do I believe that its placement was accidental. While Singapore holds great respect for the accomplishments of Hong Kong Taiwan, and South Korea, it has a genuine fear of what citizens might derive from the political lessons of these three distinct societies. Singapore has been a one party state since 1959, and while it maintains democratic institutions, at least nominally, it lacks the features typically associated with a vibrant civil society. To cite an example from NUS, when a colleague and I first taught the Korea module in 2009, we showed footage of democratization in late 1980s and early 1990s, including typical South Korea demonstration footage taken from news coverage. A student asked in class whether this was “real,” as she thought we were showing something taken from a drama or staged for effect. With the exception of its early 1960s race riots, Singapore has never undergone a comparable process or the type of social struggle associated with these other sites, and at present, shows no major signs of a willingness to engage. For NUS, I suspect this constraint will have real effects in how much the university is willing to accommodate a Korean studies program and on what terms. Certainly, the combined impact of hallyu and language has been substantial, and the university is motivated to exploit both of these trends for pedagogy. In terms of social issues and comparative work, I have also suggested that NUS wants to promote this through the establishment of Global Studies. For a close historical look at the long-term past, and the dynamics of change, Korea offers great potential to Singapore, and yet, I suspect this is precisely what NUS does not want from Korean studies. In no way am I claiming that NUS would censor or invalidate such content. It is more that the university is extremely pragmatic in its orientation, and has a tendency to steer almost every discussion to matters of policy, looking for quick bullet points and lessons. This means a tendency to limit the scope and impact of the humanities, and to place too much emphasis on the power of a quantitative social science, whether for Korean Studies or other fields. As I close here, this last note of pessimism should not dominate what otherwise is grounds for positive developments. Southeast Asia and South Korea are going to continue to have a developing relationship, and Singapore offers potential as a site for scholarship and research. A growing number of NUS departments have Korean staff members in tenure track positions, especially in the Business School and FASS (Faculty of Arts and Sciences). Even at the everyday level, it is possible to hear Korean language around Singapore much more readily than perhaps a decade ago, and the quality of the Korean food is much better, given the opening of numerous new restaurants run by native Koreans. The real issue remains one of moving beyond the comparative impulse, which is simply a starting point, and asking the hard questions, which sometimes produce uncomfortable answers. Singapore is not prepared to do this yet, and will soon be forced to as it undergoes its own social changes in the post-Lee era.

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