Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea's Initiative in ASEAN and the Philippines

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Eduardo T. Gonzalez
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Name in Latin Alphabet: Eduardo T. Gonzalez
Nationality: Philippines
Affiliation: Professor, Asian Center, University of the Philippines


Introduction

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) is a well-documented success story, remarkably overcoming the historical misfortunes of colonization and civil war and modernizing into a developed and democratic society. In the span of a single generation (1960s to 1990s), South Korea crossed over from a hard-up nation into an economic regional power, capped by its accession into the rich nations’ club, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It has amassed capabilities that have reverberations far beyond the confines of the Korean Peninsula.

A recognized economic model for developing nations to try to be like, South Korea has not self-consciously lived out its regional power credentials until recently, when it began practicing “middle power diplomacy”. In the manner of Evans (2011), South Korea has exploited a real opportunity for effective action (development assistance to poor countries); concentrated its physical capacity where it has the most impact (“niche” diplomacy in Southeast Asia), applied creativity where it mattered (green growth technology for developing countries), and established credibility for its actions (launching of New Asia Initiative independent of its traditional alliance relationship with the United States). It has thus joined the diplomatic activism of a small number of emerging regional powers[1].

Conceptual framework

The concept of “middle power” is used in this study as a template to elaborate on South Korea’s growing standing in regional politics. What sets middle power diplomacy apart is a commitment to multilateralism, conflict mediation and international activism. For middle powers, public diplomacy is exercised to gain regional or even global “authority” through the use of “soft power”[2], the ability to win over rather than coerce people (of other nations) and to shape their long-term attitudes and preferences, or, in a manner of speaking, to win hearts and minds rather than win wars (Sohn, 2012; Ikenberry, 2004, Cho, 2012). “Soft power” diplomacy steers clear of customary carrot-and-stick foreign policy instruments, in lieu of which networks, compelling narratives, and coalition-building are developed and propagated (McClory, 2015). South Korea’s own foreign policy discourse expressly talks about “middle power” or junggyun-guk diplomacy, a trend that started in 2008 following the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration (Sook-Jung Lee, 2012).

In this paper, the focus will be South Korea’s exercise of statecraft in ASEAN in general, and the Philippines in particular. It differs from conventional analysis of Korean middle power diplomacy by following in part Shim and Flamm (2012), which emphasizes more “regional power” agency and less geopolitical structure. Although Shim and Flamm eschew the term “middle power” (to them it means the country is unlikely to lead or incapable of leading and more likely to be led), this study feels the concept captures enough of Korea’s capacity to act in the Southeast Asian stage and influence its regional dynamics.

The Shim and Flamm agency approach avoids the pervasive representation of South Korea’s foreign policy and diplomacy as being constrained by geopolitical conditions in the Korean Peninsula, which in turn requires an uninterrupted singular focus on North Korea and the US-ROK alliance that provides the country’s security. According to Shim and Flamm, the popular metaphor―”shrimp among whales”―incorrectly gives the impression that the great powers China, Japan, Russia and the United States which surround South Korea constrict its ability to maneuver and thus limit its foreign policy choices. They argue instead on what Seoul is capable of, in terms of its endowment, influence and reputation in the global arena. Sheen (2014) lists down what the focus should be: the amazing rise of South Korea’s global capability, the inspiring quality of its national power, as evidenced by the qualitative force of the Korean economy and its military power; headship in such high-tech sectors and key industries as electronics, communications, automobiles, shipbuilding and construction; constant participation in peacekeeping operations in more than 20 countries, and the wide-reaching hallyu (Korean Wave) explosion, in the form of Korean films, drama, and pop music.

This paper is organized into three parts. The first part critically assesses South Korean middle power statecraft in terms of it delimitation, endowment, influence and reputation. In this part, the paper contends that agency power should be the new source of South Korea’s diplomatic strength in contemporary times, rather than its structure. To some extent, it will take a close look at how South Korea has utilized its soft power in order to hedge the risk of being encircled by stronger powers in its geopolitical location. The second part examines South Korean middle power dynamics in the Southeast Asian region, where power contestation is taking place between the United States and Japan, on the one hand, and China on the other. The third part showcases Korea’s middle power diplomacy in the Philippines. The conclusion summarizes the lessons from South Korea’s practice of middle power foreign policy, and suggests some policy directions to harmonize its diplomacy with alliance politics in Southeast Asia.

Methodology

Shim and Flamm (2012)’s “novel account of South Korea’s foreign policy options” (p. ¬3) is operationalized and discussed through four criteria for the materialization of middle power:

1. Delimitation focuses on the territorial, economic, cultural, or political context which entrench South Korea.

2. Pretension revolves around the issue of what leadership claims are asserted by South Korea.

3. Endowment answers the question of how equipped (in terms of predominantly material resources) South Korea is in its foreign policy initiatives.

4. Influence refers to the level of leverage or impact South Korea has on important issues of regional economic and political significance.

5. Recognition relates to the intersubjective nature of interstate relations and the degree of general respect such relations commands.

These factors are not mutually exclusive. Influence, or South Korea’s sway in regional affairs, for instance, is also a function of the scale of its endowment. Although having few resources is not a hindrance to middle power aspiration, the route is easier for those who can command resources. Reputation likewise is not a stand-alone attribute; it derives from reliable leadership and credible commitment to a chosen foreign policy trajectory. On the basis of these characteristics, the next sections discuss South Korea’s current role as a regional power.

The study relies mostly on secondary literature: journal articles, books, newspaper accounts and statistics derived from various credible sources.

The middle power characteristics of South Korea

Delimitation

On the face of it, the “shrimp among whales” outlook seems to be an existential geopolitical reality, since South Korea, like it or not, is anxiously located in the cross-hair juncture of North-east Asia’s three largest powers (China, Japan and Russia) (Hwang, 2012), which defines South Korea’s constant dependence on the United States for its most important security needs. Yet in many ways it has not constrained South Korea’s foreign policy behavior, nor has it absolutely established its diplomatic borders.

What is more important is how South Korea has positioned itself in a manner that facilitates its knack to compete or cooperate with others, exercise convening and brokering capabilities and offset the constraints of geography. Under a different measure─networking outside territorial confinement─South Korea seems to fare exceedingly well. Network theory suggests that what matters is “centrality” in a set of connections that provide opportunities for influence (Chang, 2009; Kim, 2004), not location in a geographic sense. Playing the central role in a functional way in a network power game is what matters (Kim, 2014).

Indeed, even within the enduring Cold War atmosphere in the Peninsula, South Korea has managed to find a middle way between its alliance diplomacy with the US and its multilateral approach in Northeast Asia. For instance, as an active player in the Six Party Talks (along with China, the US, Japan, North Korea, and Russia)―a regional multilateral attempt to create a platform for cooperation on common security concerns―South Korea has demonstrated its ability to engage in collective problem-solving among powers whose strategic interests do not necessarily converge (Smith, 2009). China, Japan and South Korea are also together in a trilateral dialogue of shared interests through an annual summit of their heads of state. In all, Korea’s ability to capitalize on this multi-party connectivity has boosted its middle power credentials (Sohn, 2012), so much so that simultaneously, the US has expressed support to the multilateral initiatives and China has acknowledged South Korea’s constructive influence in the region (Sook-Jong Lee, 2012). Such a pairwise balancing act has given South Korea more geopolitical space (International Crisis Group, 2013), and shifts the terrain of US-ROK cooperation into a less bilateral setting (Chun, 2014). It has set off a trend for South Korea to assert a level of autonomous engagement not just in Northeast Asia but elsewhere, including the broader East Asian region (Hwang, 2012). After all, an indispensable ingredient of middle power diplomacy is the country’s ability to pursue an active foreign policy of its own, unfettered by (but not necessarily in defiance of) traditional alliance relationships (Evans, 2011).

A clear sign that its policy priorities are significantly its own is the fact that South Korea has opted to make more balancing choices, in the wake of the strong adversarial tendencies in the Sino-US relationship. South Korea has deemed it beneficial to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)─clearly a challenge to the US global economic leadership. It has also launched the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). In both cases, the US has expressed its misgivings (Synder, 2015). Yet it is precisely these autonomous actions that have allowed South Korea to achieve remarkable success.

Pretension

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In the competition for regional leadership, soft power opens new doors. South Korea’s leadership aspirations focus attention on its ability to change the preferences of other nations, such as its Asian neighbors. But just how much is its soft power?

McClory (2014) takes Nye’s three primary sources of soft power (political values and institutions, foreign policy and culture) as a starting point and builds on them in constructing a soft power index. In Table 1, South Korea scored quite decidedly, earning a good grade for its early adoption of soft power among Asian nations (Fensom, 2015).

A strong indication of South Korea’s pretension to regional leadership as a regional force supplying global goods is embedded in South Korea’s Global Korea (NSS 2009) national security strategy, which foresees the growth and spreading out of its worldwide role. A good part of this strategy is the New Asia Initiative, an attempt by South Korea to boost its leverage in the region by acting as a bridge between developed and developing Asian countries (which, whatever their prevailing differences, share specific interests and and can be coaxed to work together) and as their voice in the international community. In the new regional policy, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania are the target consitutencies for deepening ties with states in the fields of trade, energy and cultural exchange (Shim and Flamm, 2012).

Increasing aid (ODA) disbursements to developing countries and regions is yet another way South Korea is raising its leadership profile. In 2013, South Korea’s ODA disbursements to developing countries totaled USD 1,309.58 million. More than half of these went to Asia (USD 771.72 million), broken down into Southeast Asia (USD 416.80 million), South and Central Asia (USD 300.92 million), and West Asia USD 40.60 million). From 2008 to 2013, Korea’s ODA expenditures in the developing world jumped by 146%, in Asia, by 175% (OECD, 2014). That majority of Korea’s donor aid were spent in Asia is another indication of South Korea’s goal of regional leadership.

Korea made an impressive mark in the various diplomatic conferences it hosted, among which are the G20 Summit in Seoul (2010), the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (2011), the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul (2012) and the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace (2013) (Kim, 2014). As a convenor, it has gathered states and non-state actors to work together for shared understandings and norms.

Its "green growth" enterprise, originally designed to protect its own environment, has found its way in developing countries. Its project for the application of green technology has resulted in a USD 200 million grant to the East Asia Climate Partnership to assist developing nations to cope with climate change. Green growth programs are in place in Brazil, Indonesia, and Ethiopia through its contribution of $10 million to the Global Green Growth Institute. South Korea also pledged USD 50 million, together with Norway and Qatar, for environmental ventures in 18 countries (Kin, 2013).

Hwang (2012) likewise catalogs South Korea’s globally responsible initiatives: a speedy and significant response to the earthquake in Haiti (January 2010); taking part in a worldwide cooperative endeavor to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); sending ships to join in multinational efforts to battle pirates in the Gulf of Aden; and expanded contributions to peacekeeping operations.

Endowment

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Middle power diplomacy requires accumulating resources and concentrating them where they are likely to have the most useful impact. South Korea’s strength lies in its huge supply of economic goods. It ranked 13th worldwide in terms of its GDP totaling USD 1.410 trillion in 2014. Comparison of Korea’s national wealth with other Asian countries (Table 2), made on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP), to adjust for differences in the cost of living in different countries, suggests that it is not far behind Russia and “like-minded” middle powers like Brazil and India. It is ahead of Mexico and South Africa, and certainly all Southeast Asian countries, in economic power.

A brief look at the regional trade statistics (Table 3) shows how deeply embedded South Korea’s economy is in regional trade relations. With the exception of the United States, all its top export partners are in Asia, with China getting almost half of the export volume.

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Majority of its top import partners are also in Asia, if the West Asian countries of Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are counted. Again, China is the top importer of Korean goods, and South Korea does have a positive trade balance with its giant neighbor.

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With regard to foreign direct investment (FDI), South Korea’s outward FDI stocks in 2014 accounted for USD 259 billion, almost 20 times that of 1995, and inward FDI stocks for USD 182 billion, 10 times that of 1995 (Table 4). As a proportion of GDP, the country’s FDI outward stock rose from 2.4% in 1995 to 18.2% in 2013, indicating the huge investments that Korea is pouring abroad, again another signal of its capacity as a global economic powerhouse. These augment South Korea’s image as a confident investor with which partner countries can reliably do business.

As well, according to the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs , since South Korea created a Free Trade Agreement Roadmap in 2003, thus far, FTAs with Chile, Singapore, EFTA, ASEAN, India and Peru, EU and US have entered into force. Korea is currently negotiating FTAs with Australia, New Zealand, Colombia, Canada, Turkey, Mexico and China. In 2012, negotiations for a tripartite Korea-China-Japan FTA have begun―another indication of its active involvement in trilateralism.

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South Korea’s R&D intensity, meanwhile remains steady around 3.6% of GDP in 2014, as the global epicenter in R&D investments shifts toward it (Group of 8, 2014). Even if the gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) patterns are not expected to change significantly in 2014, there are some unmistakable realities. South Korea’s total investments in R&D as a percentage of GDP are the highest in the world (Table 5). With investments of 3.6% of its GDP into R&D activities in 2014, South Korea outranked key science and technology players including, for instance, France (2.3%), Germany (2.9%), Japan (3.4%) and the United States (2.8%). It is ahead of China (2.0%), India (0.9%), Brazil (1.3%), and Russia (1.5%).

In addition, South Korea is one of the acknowledged global leaders in specific high‐technology sectors, such as the heavy industries (ships, cars, and steel), the petrochemical and nuclear industries, and consumer electronics. The country is home to Samsung, Hyundai, Posco and LG, among others, which manufacture premium‐brand products (Shim and Flamm, 2012). Likewise, South Korea has invested heavily in its culture and creative industries, symbolized by hallyu. Then too, South Korea is a competitive player in the global arms market and exports defense products (Shim and Flamm, 2012).

Thus, it is evident that South Korea has attained its middle power status to a great extent by mounting up vast economic and financial resources.

Influence

South Korea has enlarged its political weight on regional and global governance matters, positioning itself as an influential actor in the regional stage. Its provision of global goods, ranging from hosting summits and sending peacekeeping troops, to countering piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden and responding to humanitarian crises, has clearly increased its global authority in these fields.

In what may be termed derived power, South Korea has increased its diplomatic leverage with the increase in its voting rights in international bodies (due to the upgrading of its quota in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund): this assures it of a greater decision-making role in these financial institutions. Its admission in 2009 to OECD’s Donor Assistance Committee, which supplies 90% of ODA funding, offers opportunities to help shape the global aid agenda. Likewise, the success of the “Korean Wave” has permitted South Korea to make an imprint on the cultural landscape of its neighbors (Shim and Flamm, 2012).

Recognition

How is South Korea seen as operating with moral authority and legitimacy in its conduct abroad? Within its own backyard, its role as an equal partner in trilateral cooperation (between China, Japan and itself) has been recognized with the founding of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) in Seoul. As a permanent intergovernmental body, the TCS gives South Korea the ability to arbitrate and smooth the progress of rule-making among the three Northeast Asian powers (Shim and Flamm, 2012). In an earlier period, its admission into OECD has symbolized its recognition as a developed nation.

Most of all, South Korea’s reputation rests on the global respect it has garnered as an economic model not just for developing countries but for similarly-scaled middle powers. Its economic take-off within a relatively short time frame─credited to the country’s state-led strategic interventions─ is an exemplar for other nations to copy. The importance of this subject― to what degree the lessons from the Korean experience might be portable or applied elsewhere―has increased since South Korea is now a leading supplier of development assistance and guidance to developing countries (Noland, 2011). This puts Seoul in a tight spot, since the Korean success story involves a pair of ingredients that may not be simultaneously replicable: (1) the use of investment subsidies, administrative guidance and public enterprise to free coordination bottlenecks, conditioned by a set of favorable initial conditions (significant level of human capital, relatively equal distribution of income and wealth) (Rodrik, 1994); and (2) legitimization of authoritarianism in the short-term and empowerment of civil society groups that paved the way for democratic governance in the long-term (Ringen, et al., 2011). Nevertheless, despite its contentious nature, the Korean model of rapid growth alongside wide-ranging government intervention has remained as an alternative to market-led progress, and raised the bar for the entire development field.

What Korean middle power play does for ASEAN

In the past, Southeast Asia was a zero-sum battleground for South Korea because of its preoccupation with the ideological tensions in the Peninsula. That fixation has changed, however, since Southeast Asia is neutral ground compared with the complicated faultlines of Northeast Asia (Hwang, 2012). South Korea today is amazingly full of activity in Southeast Asia, principally in ASEAN.

Delimitation

When South Korean President Park Geun-hye paid Washington a visit recently, she talked the disjuncture between Asia’s growing economic teamwork and its troubling political and security worries, which she termed “Asia’s paradox” (Ignatius, 2015). Yet, South Korea’s taking advantage of a wide array of strategic cooperative opportunities in Southeast Asia itself shores up security and stability in the region, mainly among the ASEAN countries.

To be sure, this interaction between South Korea and Southeast Asia is not exactly unrelated to the existing ROK-US alliance relationship or to the US “pivot” and “rebalancing” toward Asia-Pacific (Hwang, 2012a). As Limaye (2012) suggests, these two sets of linkages are not mutually exclusive, and consequently, the ROK-US alliance is not an outlier or a stand-alone deal today. Rather, because US current security strategy in the region indicates a shift toward multilateralism, historical bilateral agreements must be seen as jumping boards for broader alliances. In turn, intensifying multilateral security relationships commit partner countries to advancing the economic progress of the region. The key for the US, according to Hwang (2012), is to deepen regional multilateral institutions, such as the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral engagement, and ASEAN + 3. The US regards ASEAN as the “fulcrum” of the regional architecture-building (but not automatically order-building) project (Limaye, 2012) that could help to stabilize Southeast Asia.

A cautionary note is offered by Hwang (2012), who rightly argues that the primary incentive of South Korea for its vigorous engagement in Asia is not to enhance the ROK-US alliance. Rather, it is driven by a need for “nationalistic survival” that motivates it to maintain a singular attention to stockpiling economic resources as the means to hold on to political independence and sovereignty and take advantage of huge opportunities for strategic economic engagement with Southeast Asia.

Pretension

South Korea’s engagement with ASEAN is not new. In 1989, South Korea initiated an official dialogue with ASEAN, culminating with the adoption of the Joint Declaration on the Com-prehensive Cooperation Partnership in 2004. Former President Lee Myung-bak launched the New Asia Initiative (NAI) during an official tour of Southeast Asia in March 2009, to “enhance substantial cooperation with all the countries of Asia, and ASEAN in particular” (Hwang, 2012). The Korea-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, signed in 2010, opened a new window for political-security cooperation (Jaehyon Lee, 2012).

It was NAI which was in many senses a quantum leap, as it laid out a vision for a more self-assured South Korean leadership within Asia in the political, security, and economic realms. The strategy was context-driven, as it dovetails the approach to specific regions and countries. ASEAN, Oceania and South Asia were set as the core focal points of NAI. For ASEAN, Korea already had existing relations and interests in place─strategic (regional security), economic (trade, investment and emerging market) and socio-cultural (exponential growth of people and cultural exchange). NAI’s aim was to enhance these initiatives through a three-pronged forward blueprint: economic-development cooperation, green growth-climate change cooperation and socio-cultural cooperation. Accordingly, Korea kicked off many initiatives such as FTAs, ODA increase, knowledge sharing, support for ASEAN Integration, support for the East Asia Climate Change Partnership, technical cooperation, and setting up of Korea Cultural Centers and so on. From 2008-2012, at least 39 summit level dialogues between Korea and ASEAN, Oceania and South Asian countries took place, and many new programs were carried out through these dialogues and meetings (Jaehyon Lee, 2012).

Endowment

Southeast Asia has the third largest combined economy in Asia after China and Japan—with much opportunity for expansion given relatively low per capita incomes, rising populations and trends in integration. The region is also the top destination for direct foreign investment in all of Asia (Limaye, 2012). Naturally, it holds quite a lot of appeal for such a heavily export-oriented economy as South Korea. In the two decades since the start of the official relationship with ASEAN in 1989, trade leaped 11-fold from USD 8.2 billion to USD 90.2 billion (Hwang, 2012). The two-way trade between South Korea and ASEAN amounted to US$135 billion in 2013─a 3% hike from the 2012 trade volume of US$131 billion─making ASEAN South Korea’s second largest trading partner and South Korea the fifth largest trading partner of ASEAN (Seachon, 2015). In part, this was made possible by the Korea-ASEAN FTAs (on Trade in Goods, and on Trade in Services) which were in force beginning 2007 and 2009, respectively (Hwang, 2012).

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In 2014, the top South Korea trade partners accounted for 64.9% of total South Korean exports. Most of the goods went to East Asia and Southeast Asia, with China getting 25.4% of overall exports. A large volume of such exports to China are for processing and re-exported to the European markets, making South Korea vulnerable to any European economic downturn. Southeast Asia has been a “safety net” for South Korean regional exports. ASEAN members which were in the top 15 importers of Korean goods included Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. All 15 listed countries increased their imports from South Korea from 2010 to 2014, with a least amount of gain of 1.8% for Taiwan. The greatest gain was for Viet Nam (up 131.4%) over that 5-year period, followed by Saudi Arabia (up 81.9%) and Philippines (up 72.1%) . Meanwhile, FDIs from South Korea to ASEAN, amounted to USD 3.5 billion in 2013 (Seachon, 2015).

A key dynamic in Korea’s exports is the presence of overseas Korean communities. They do have a positive impact on Korean trade by generating more exports than imports. Estimates suggest that a doubling of Korean émigrés increase South Korea’s exports by 16 percent and its imports by 14 percent (Choi, 2003). The Korean diaspora―7,012,492 Koreans were scattered in 151 countries in 2013―thus has had a salutary effect on South Korea’s economic miracle. Table 6 shows that Asia hosts a significant number of overseas Koreans, with China, Central Asia and Southeast Asia providing most of the “second home” for these migrants.

Influence

South Korea is uniquely positioned to play the credible and “non-aligned” middleman in Southeast Asia. Unlike most of ASEAN (notably the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia), South Korea has no terri¬torial and historical disputes with China. Unlike Vietnam, it has little pent-up nationalistic resentment against China. Unlike many of the Southeast Asian countries, it has no troubled history of colonial¬ism under the West. Indeed, culturally, South Korea resonates well in the region where a hierarchical Confucian perspective that focuses on collective community values is more agreeable than western representations that encourage individualism and adherence to written law and institutions. Its past anguish suffered under Japanese rule and Chinese domination, ironically, has reverberation in Southeast Asian nations with similar historical experience (Hwang. 2012).

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It is thus no accident that South Korea earned its keep in the ASEAN integration process by supplying the conceptual foundation for a “regional community” architecture. At the initiative of then President Kim Dae‐jung, against the backdrop of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korea helped establish the so‐called East Asia Vision Group at the ASEAN+3 (APT) Summit in 1998 (Shim and Flamm, 2012). The EAVG, which was composed of eminent intellectuals, explored ways to expand and intensify mid-to-long term regional cooperation in political and socio-cultural sectors, including economic ties, to facilitate further development of the East Asian Community. The successor East Asia Vision Group II (EAVG II), founded in 2011, met regularly until 2012. In the APT Commemorative Summit in November 2012, the APT leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment to deepening and broadening the evolving regional architecture to support the realization of the ASEAN Community (ASEAN, 2014).

On another front, as part of its job when it became a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009, South Korea, successively increased its ODA budget. It spent USD 862 million in 2009, with Southeast Asia receiving the lion’s share of the funds (Hwang, 2012). As part of Seoul’s campaign of a “Global Korea,” it allocated over USD 1 billion for its ODA in 2011, making it the 17th largest among the 23 major donor nations (Wong, 2012). Figure 1 shows that 51.2% of Korea’s gross bilateral ODA all went to Asian countries, including five ASEAN nations. The ROK government further pledged to expend USD 100 million to ASEAN, from its USD 200 million overall budget for the East Asia Climate Partnership (Hwang, 2012).

South Korea has likewise pledged to support ASEAN projects, through the ASEAN-ROK Special Cooperation Fund (SCF) and the ASEAN-ROK Future Oriented Cooperation Fund (FOCP), to the tune of USD 59 billion from its Regional Development Assistance fund. Sadly, however, capacity constraints in the region have prevented ASEAN countries from fully utilizing this huge amount for development programs (Seachon, 2015).

The singular measure of its cultural influence, hallyu, has made K-Pop the toast of the world, including Southeast Asia. Yet, as Hwang (2012) observes, the Korean Wave is part and parcel of Seoul’s objective to promote a flourishing, open, and integrated region that encourages creative expression.

Recognition

South Korea’s successful development experience has not stopped fascinating most of Southeast Asia and according to Hwang (2012a) still supplies demonstrative lessons for emulation. One of its early admirers was Malaysia, which chose similar trade-offs between economic growth and democracy adopted by Korea’s Park Chung-Hee, and whose Prime Minister then, Mahathir Mohamad, followed an interventionist course of action modeled on Korea’s industrial policy (often called the Big Push) in the 1970s (Woo-Cumings, 2001).

For Southeast Asia’s poor countries, South Korea is a better archetype than China, which is too enormous to duplicate, and superior, too, than Singapore, which is a city-state, or Taiwan, whose uncertain sovereignty makes it sui generis (The Economist, 12 November, 2011). South Korea’s phenomenal growth is not just the basis for its wide appeal. Its exceptional record of low income inequality and its transition from authoritarianism to a vibrant parliamentary system also invite keen attention from the region’s policy-makers. After all, many Southeast Asian economies are a mix of flawed democracies and hybrid regimes attempting to move away from autocracy and toward democratization (The Economist, 27 March 2013). Not surprisingly, when the Korea Foundation started offering an “Intellectual Exchanges” program and a “Next Generation Leaders” program―both focused on the South Korean development model, and catering mainly to visiting government ministers and bureaucrats from Southeast Asia, there was soaring demand (Hwang, 2012).


Repercussions of Korean middle power diplomacy for the Philippines

Delimitation

South Korea and the Philippines share a common ground: ROK remains steadfastly entrenched with the United States in a strong bilateral alliance, while the Philippines has sought to maintain stable, if weaker, security ties with the US, predicated on historical grounds (as a former US colony) and the US assertion as the dominant naval and military power in the Pacific Ocean. As the US moves toward rebalance in Asia founded more on multilateral alliances, South Korea and the Philippines have started sharing a convergent security agenda.

As Korea increases its geopolitical influence in the region, both countries have exploited structural opportunities in traditional human security issues. In October 2013, the two countries signed off on a major agreement expanding defense cooperation. A USD 420 million contract in March to export 12 FA-50 fighter jets to the Philippines quickly ensued (Song, 2014). The expanded defense deals, Song argues, points towards Seoul’s implicit support to Manila in its maritime dispute against China, as does a recent donation of a 1,200 ton corvette warship. Manila has acquired two old Hamilton-class ex-US Coast Guard cutters for the Philippine navy and six river patrol boats, and has presented to South Korea a shopping list that includes radar systems, anti-submarine helicopters, amphibious assault vehicles, and surface-to-air missiles (Simon, 2013).

Pretension

South Korea’s “frontline” leadership became apparent in the Philippines with its recent provision of a global good: humanitarian assistance. In the immediate aftermath of Super-typhoon Haiyan which struck the Philippines in 2013, South Korea deployed a military contingent to provide logistical and engineering assistance to humanitarian operations in middle Philippines. 540 South Korean troops arrived in two six-month deployments. The contingent stayed in Leyte and Samar provinces―the hardest hit areas―for one year (USAID, 2013). It was South Korea’s largest and longest peacetime humanitarian mission ever to help a close ally recover from the destruction brought by history’s strongest storm ever to hit land (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 December 2014).

South Korea’s humanitarian diplomacy has facilitated effective leadership responding to the needs of devastated populations in typhoon-ravaged areas in the Philippines. It has a well-established agency, the Ministry of Public Safety and Security, charged with developing national capacity to respond to disasters. The experience that South Korea gained from its own disasters became the platform for the country’s expanding humanitarian involvement overseas.

Endowment

It was the ASEAN-ROK Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation signed in 2005 which expanded Philippine trade in goods and services with South Korea and attracted more Korean investments to the country (Wong, 2013).

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South Korea ranked as the Philippines’ 5th major trading partner, 6th export market and 5th import supplier. Philippine exports to South Korea rose by 18% from USD 2.88 billion in 2012 to USD 3.4 billion in 2013, while Philippine imports from South Korea stepped up by 6.5% from USD 4.53 billion in 2012 to USD 4.82 billion in 2013, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). Table 7 gives the complete trade picture. From Korea’s perspective, Philippine imports in 2014 represented 1.8% of its total exports. The trade imbalance favors South Korea. According to Seacon (2015), the negative trade balance is occasioned by the low-value added of products made by Filipino domestic industries, and inability to process natural resource endowments available in the country, such as metals. These compel the Philippines to export unprocessed copper and iron, for instance, which possibly come back as metal-based manufactures from Korea.

South Korea is also one of the largest sources of foreign direct investments (FDI) in the Philippines, along with Japan, US, and the Netherlands. In 2012, it received USD 931.8 million worth of FDI from South Korea, making it the top recipient of Korean investments in Southeast Asia. Major Korean investments are in shipbuilding (Hanjin), car manufacturing (Hyundai), electronics (Samsung, LG) and power (KEPCO ) (Wong, 2013).

Expatriate Koreans in the Philippines─the largest Korean diaspora community in Southeast Asia and the ninth-largest in the world ―also bring dollars to the country through consumer spending and direct investment in businesses such as hotels and resorts, a manifestation of the mutual interest of both countries (Asian Sentinel, 11 July 2007). Koreans remain the biggest source market in Philippine tourism with a 24.9% share in the total inbound visitors or equal to 1.17 million arrivals. It posted a 13% growth rate by 2014 yearend.

Influence

Diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the Philippines were established in 1949, but the good neighborly relations between the two countries truly took off when the Philippine government sent a military contingent to Korea in the 1950s, under the aegis of the UN, in support of South Korean sovereignty and freedom during the Korean War. South Korea was for a time also the recipient of development assistance from the Philippines, which it utilized for reconstruction.

In a reversal of roles, South Korea is now one of the Philippines’ major aid donors. This reciprocal gesture is evident in South Korea’s significant aid contributions. It has hiked its ODA to the country from USD 300 million under its 2007-2009 program to USD 500 million in its 2011-2013 program (Wong, 2013). Total active official Korean ODA loans, according to NEDA, amounted to USD 524.76 million while total grants stood at US$ 83.96 million as of December 2013.

In 2012, South Korea gave a USD 19.76 million grant to carry out developmental programs and projects in the Philippines. It was part of the 2012-2015 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for the Philippines, which outlines the general policies and priorities of Korean ODA. The aid is assigned to projects on rural development, infrastructure and energy, human resources development, information technology, health services, disaster relief and mitigation (Wong, 2012). The CPS supports the Philippine Development Plan (2011-2016) under the Aquino administration by allocating 70% of its budget on three priority areas: (1) promoting sustainable economic growth through transport infrastructure development; (2) supporting food security and rural poverty alleviation through agriculture and water resources development; and (3) strengthening national health systems and local health services.

Yet another worthy initiative is the Multi-Industry Cluster (MIC) Program that seeks to create “synergy among major industries like manufacturing and services to drive economic growth, and seeks to address the underdeveloped sectors in the country by putting up investments in areas such as agriculture, labor, and manufacturing” (Wong, 2013).

As South Korea basks on the popularity of the “Korean Wave,” expectations have risen for more Korean cultural activities in the Philippines. Consequently, South Korea has organized regular Korean film festivals, cultural performances, and K-Pop concerts in the country. Filipinos have taken a strong liking for Korean dramas shown on local TV and Korean brands such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai (Wong, 2013).

Recognition

Does South Korea’s success story make it a convincing model for the Philippines, as Wong (2013) argues it should? This is of particular interest since the Philippines was similar to Korea in many respects but was far less successful. That the Philippines fell back suggests what Korea did right, policy-wise; theory-wise, it asks which factors made the real difference (Wan, 2004). In “Making A Miracle,” Lucas (1993) noted that South Korea and the Philippines were alike in levels of human resources, and industrial structure in the 1960s (Kim and Heshmati, 2014), as well as in income per capita, education achievement, openness to world trade and the export mix (Wan, 2004). Yet from 1960-1988, Lucas pointed out, the Philippines’ average annual growth rate was only 1.8%, while Korea’s rate was soaring at 6.2% per annum (Kim and Heshmati, 2014), and over time, the Philippines had lagged behind all newly-industrializing countries and the ASEAN 3 (Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore) (Wan, 2004).

Lucas suggested that what provided the difference at the micro-level was learning effectiveness: Korea had a better learning-by-doing model─worker productivity made effective use of technical knowhows─that transformed its industrial structure with low-added value to a higher added value (Kim and Heshmati, 2014).

At the macro-level, the Korean model’s superiority lay in the state having a great deal of capacity, which obviously was in short-supply in the Philippines then. Korea had a long history of centralized state authority with a homogeneous national identity (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno and Robinson, 2015). By contrast, the Philippines’ post-war governmental institutions were saddled with structural weaknesses.

The Korean success story actually gained respect in the Philippines on account of what Korea did right that the Philippines could not accomplish: multi-dimensional state capacity to coordinate industrial activities, provide public goods like human capital, raise resources, and implement social policy.

South Korea has lately introduced the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) wherein the Korean government imparts lessons to Philippine officials from its development experience. The KSP adopts a multidimensional and comprehensive approach that is supposed to highlight Korea’s comparative strengths suitable to Philippine conditions such as village development, information technology, disaster management and climate change (Wong, 2013). Hopefully, through knowledge sharing, the Koreans should have also learned their lessons on what not to pass on to their Filipino counterparts.


Concluding notes

South Korea’s middle power activism in ASEAN is more of the “diffuse” rather than the “heroic” kind: advancing many initiatives in calculated but prudent means, rather than orchestrating action in an ambitious and risk-taking way. In the manner of Evans (2011), South Korea’s diplomacy is not designed to produce spectacular results; frequently it involves making progress on providing global public goods (free trade, humanitarian assistance)─with all the accompanying free-rider, sovereign-preference, and weak-link problems―painstakingly, and without fanfare. Yert such approach, according to Evans, is the only way to produce suitable solutions and deliver the goods. In the words of Nye (cited in McClory, 2015), the outcomes have to be coaxed into fruition, not coerced like hard power approaches. Given this outlook, it is useful to derive a few instructive insights from Korea’s middle power diplomacy, again using the four Shim-Flamm measures.

Delimitation

At the outset, it was posited that what drives South Korean middle power activism is agency rather than structure. It has proven its capacity to act independently and to make its own free choices, its decisions unhindered by its geographic location and security alliances. It has concentrated on being constructively involved in what Chun (2015) calls “mini-lateral” mechanisms, such as the ASEAN+3 (APT) and the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral initiative. Such action, according to Chun, demonstrates flexibility in managing a fewer number of players, in the hope that such multi-track gatherings will eventually end up as larger multilateral assemblies. The key for then for South Korea is to develop progressively robust ties with partners in Southeast Asia, and ensure the compatibility of its networks with multilateral arrangements that generate creative opportunities for more adaptable engagements.

Within the context of its participation in the US-led hub-and-spokes alliance system in Southeast Asia, South Korea can provide lessons for its ASEAN partners (most importantly including the Philippines) on how to redefine strong alliance diplomacy with the United States on the one hand, and balanced multilateral diplomacy on the other. On the other hand, as Cronin, et al. (2014) suggest, the US can reciprocate by searching for more novel ways to work with traditional allies to increase the effectiveness of its multilateral security assistance.

Pretension

South Korea’s leadership style is basically supportive, participatory, integrative, and aimed at co-opting the behavior of partners (changing preferences) rather than commanding their behavior. It has not, to paraphrase Chun (2015) anchored its ASEAN linkages on a zero-sum game, nor pursued hegemonic dominance. South Korea has exercised its social power positively, or as Sohn (2012) puts it, as a convener able to bring together states and non-state actors to work together for common understandings and interests.

There is a stepped-up desire of South Korea to be a “co-architect” in regional institutions (Synder, 2015), but this effort requires more than providing system adjustments and adaptations. Meanwhile, South Korea needs to maintain its active networking in ASEAN on developmental matters, and in the case of the Philippines, preserve the goodwill illustrated by its leadership in knowledge sharing and humanitarian assistance.

Endowment

Kakeu and Gaudet (2010) have made simulations that indicate that the social and political returns on proven economic strength outweigh the benefits of hegemonic aspirations. Without much economic power, they argue, the tendency of poorly-endowed countries is to expect a greater return from a divisive, harshly competitive hegemony race in an asymmetric world composed of both rich and poor countries. Thus, the resolution is to endow countries with lesser wealth. In this instance, it makes sense for South Korea to assist poorer ASEAN countries to attain the level of South Korea, or in the case of middle-income Philippines, ensure that its institutions are fortified so that it could turn up higher economic gains. South Korea’s “niche diplomacy” can focus resources in specific Southeast Asian countries best able to produce returns worth having.

Influence

South Korea has deftly exercised its leverage. Its cache of influence strategies has produced concrete and visible results (trilateralism in Northeast Asia, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, free trade agreements in Southeast Asia) in a joint interdependent environment. Leveraging its networks and relationships has resulted in a stronger economic and social interdependence with its neighbors. The anticipation of more integration among the economies and societies of Southeast Asia has created a diplomatic impulse upon which South Korea can strengthen its opportunities for building bridges. It can be a strong co-partaker with ASEAN and the Philippines in a redefined regional identity.

Recognition

International reputation― fulfilling international obligations―is a public good. For South Korea, its standing among nations is what drives it to foster regional cooperation. As Phelan (2009) rightly argues, states willingly accept the burden that their societies will bear in order to preserve respect and recognition abroad. Yet, as Chun (2015) also correctly points out, there should be a consensus within South Korea that energetic involvement in global cooperation adds immensely to South Korea’s national interests over the long haul. South Korea’s reputational incentives, of course, derive from its own commercial and broader political agendas, but other than instantaneously self-interested motives, it has done well in giving both economic and humanitarian assistance to ASEAN, the Philippines and the rest of Asia. The international community will always accord South Korea a well-deserved recognition for as long as it takes care of collective interests, disinterestedly or otherwise.

References(Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea's Initiative in ASEAN and the Philippines)

각주

  1. Typically, these middle powers―no great powers but with huge regional influence―include Brazil, India, South Africa, Nigeria, and Mexico.
  2. Soft power was originally coined by Joseph Nye to describe the ability to attract and co-opt as a means of persuasion rather than coerce, use force or give money. Its defining feature is that it is noncoercive; it has its currency in culture, political values, and foreign policies. See Nye (1990).

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구분 제목
1 A New Imperative for Area Studies in the Internationalization of Higher Education: Case Studies of Seoul National University and the National University of Singapore
2 INDONESIA-KOREA PARTNERSHIP: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH COLLABORATION
3 THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF KOREAN WAVE IN VIETNAM(IN COMPARISON WITH JAPANESE ONE)
4 Korea's National Image Through a Content Analysis of Articles about Korea on Vietnamese Online Newspapers
5 Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea's Initiative in ASEAN and the Philippines
6 Malaysia-Korea Economic Relations: Trends and Developments
7 The Roles of Korean Development in the Mekong Region
8 Cambodia-South Korea Relations
9 Myanmar-Republic of Korea Economic Cooperation